We examine information provision as a public policy instrument when products generate damages to consumers as well as environmental externalities. We show that information provision dominates taxation in terms of welfare, if information can be provided at low cost. This is because a uniform tax alone levies a heavier than optimal burden on informed consumers and allows the uninformed consumer to free ride partially on the informed consumers' voluntary actions. If the cost of information provision is substantial, taxation is welfare superior. A policy regime that combines information provision and taxation leads to higher welfare relative to the use of either instrument alone.
Introduction
Although incentive-based approaches, when implemented, have increased cost e ciency of pollution control, they have not been able fully to explore all potential gains. A number of factors can explain this, including among others the high administrative costs resulting from the multitude and the complexity of the substances to be controlled and the indirect costs that charges generate, such as those resulting from price increases and the interaction with an existing set of taxes. Continuing the research for improving the design of pollution control policies, economists have proposed alternative methods, such as voluntary compliance programs (see, for example, Lyon and Maxwell (2004) ), recycling of environmental tax revenues to finance the reduction of distortionary taxation (see, for example, Bovenberg and Goulder (1996) and Goulder (1995)) and information provision (Tietenberg and Wheeler (1998)). These alternatives could either broaden the scope of policy or complement incentive-based instruments. The present paper contributes to this discussion by examining the use of information provision in the case of products that impose not only environmental externalities, but also damages directly on the consumers of these goods.
Throughout their life cycle, products generate environmental damages starting from extraction and processing raw materials, continuing with production, assembly, distribution, packaging, use, and maintenance and finally with their disposal at the end of their life. Some types of products are also responsible for damages inflicted directly on the consumers. Examples of such products could include fruits and vegetables grown with the use of pesticides, which generate environmental externalities during production and also health problems to consumers from residues of pesticides. Also household products such as paints, apart from the environmental damages associated with their production and disposal, release toxic chemicals that create health problems during their use. 1 In such cases, individuals have incentives to reduce the use of these types of products, by choosing, if available, less harmful substitutes. By doing so, they can also contribute to pollution control. In order to take such action however, individuals have to be aware of the damages associated with that product, which is not always the case. Thus, when the government is called to intervene, the question arises as to whether it should use economic incentives, provide information, or enact a combination of these two policies. This paper addresses the choice of policy instrument.
In particular, we examine the case of a di erentiated product o ered in two types, produced by oligopolists competing in prices. During its lifetime, this product generates an environmental externality, hereafter called external damages, and during its use imposes damages on each individual consumer of the product, hereafter called individual damages. The magnitude of both types of damages depends on the product type. We normalize by assuming that one type of the product does not generate damages at all, hereafter called the clean good, while the other type of the product, hereafter called the dirty good, generates both types of damages. We assume that consumers take into account the individual damages if they have relevant information. However, consumers' knowledge or perception of individual damages is imperfect. For simplicity, we assume two groups of consumers: those with perfect knowledge of the individual damages, and those with no knowledge at all. The informed consumers substitute away from the dirty good and towards the clean good. As a result, the relative price of the two goods changes, leading the uninformed consumers to purchase more of the dirty and less of the clean good. Since the dirty good generates external damages as well, the uninformed consumers unintentionally free ride on the informed consumers' e orts. Thus, the case examined here is characterized by three types of distortions: imperfect competition due to product di erentiation, environmental externality, and asymmetric information regarding individual damages. Within this rich framework, no single policy can be optimal, and so a combination of policies such as environmental taxation with information provision could improve welfare.
We consider three types of policy intervention. First, we assume that the regulator can levy a tax on the dirty good. We find that the optimal tax consists of a Pigouvian tax plus a term that corrects for the information asymmetry, while at the same time taking into account the fact that both firms produce less than the perfectly competitive output. We assume that the regulator does not have information on the true type of each consumer and, thus, levies a uniform tax on the dirty good purchases by all consumers. Since the informed consumers already purchase less of the dirty good, the chosen tax rate on both types of consumers turns out to be higher than optimal for the informed and lower than the optimal for the uninformed consumers. Since the dirty good generates external damages, the inability of the regulator to distinguish between the two groups of consumers exacerbates the unintentional free riding problem described above.
Second, we assume that the regulator can address the problem of the information asymmetry. Upon receiving the information, the previously uninformed consumers change their behavior. Since information provision is costly, we solve for the optimal fraction of consumers to be informed by the government. We find that the optimal fraction of consumers to which the government provides information is positively related to both individual and external damages. Information provision, although it avoids exacerbation of the free riding e ect, it is often welfare dominated by taxation because the latter is a more direct and thus more powerful instrument to internalize external damages. This is not the case if information can be provided at low marginal cost and if the fraction of consumers that are initially informed is low enough. In such cases, the government informs all consumers, and as a result, the information asymmetry distortion is eliminated entirely, while the environmental externality is also reduced. As a result, in this case, information provision improves welfare over taxation. Finally, we consider the case in which the regulator uses a combination of the two policy instruments. We derive the optimal tax rate and fraction of consumers targeted with information, and we find that each component of this policy is lower relative to the case in which either one is used alone. We find that individual consumers purchase less of the clean good under the combination of policy instruments relative to taxation, but since more consumers are informed, the aggregate demand for the clean good increases. Therefore, the combination of policies is more e ective at shifting aggregate demand towards the clean good at the same time that it reduces, relative to the case of taxation, the free riding e ect -allocating more e ciently among consumers the e ort to internalize the externality.
Information provision is one of the two ways in which advertisement has been analyzed in the economic literature. Some economists have emphasized the information-disseminating role of advertisement (both direct provision of information or indirect in the form of signalling quality). Generally, they assume that consumers are not fully informed and that they receive through advertisement complete, costless and instantly validated information (see for example Nelson (1974) , Kotowitz and Mathewson (1979a) , Kihlstrom and Riordan (1984) and Stigler (1961) ). Others have advocated that advertisement alters consumers' tastes, resulting in greater demand or lower demand elasticity for the advertised product (see for example Galbraith (1958) and Dixit and Norman (1978) ). Kotowitz and Mathewson (1979b) examine the "persuasive" aspect of advertisement without including advertisement in consumers' utility. This paper examines environmental information provision as a public policy instrument.
In the environmental economics literature, only a few papers address the issue of environmental advertisement. Most of these studies examine the role that an environmental group can play by informing consumers and the interplay with polluting firms (see for example Liston-Heyes (2001), Heijnen and Schoonbeek (2005) and Heyes and Maxwell (2005) , the latter in an international context). Some studies also consider environmentally aware consumers and product di erentiation, a framework similar to ours, and yet examine price policy instruments only (see for example Bansal and Gangopadhyay (2003) and Moraga-Gonzalez and Padron-Fumero (2002)).
To the best of our knowledge, only two papers examine environmental information provision as a public policy instrument. The first paper, by Tietenberg and Wheeler (1998), proposes an expansion of environmental policy into the provision of information. They review the di erent settings under which provision of information is important (household, consumption, employment and community). They further assess the role of government in detecting environmental risks, assuring reliable information, and providing new channels through which information can be used -when the existing channels are not enough. This study provides substantial support to our argument in favour of informative advertisement. The second paper, by Kennedy, Laplante and Maxwell (1994), examines whether and under what circumstances the government should provide environmental information. The framework of their analysis di ers substantially from the current paper. They assume that the polluting good generates environmental damages (with no individual damages) and that consumers cannot relate with certainty these damages to their utility. Information is provided to consumers by private firms at a cost. The informed consumers know the true marginal external damage and take into account the e ect that their own consumption has on their utility. In the current paper we assume that each individual's consumption of the dirty good has a negligible e ect on the total external damage a ecting her utility, and for that reason we do not introduce environmental damages in her utility. Instead, we assume that individual damages are associated with the consumption of the dirty good. Furthermore Kennedy, Laplante and Maxwell assume that the uninformed consumers have a belief over the value of the marginal external damage that is positive and could exceed its true value. Under this assumption, they show that even costless information provision could decrease welfare. Contrary to our results, they find that environmental taxation alone can attain the social optimum, since the only distortion is the environmental externality. The only case in which public information provision can play a role is when taxation induces private information provision. The structure of our model allows publicly provided information to play a more important role.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model establishing the need for regulatory intervention. Section 3 considers the case of taxation, while Section 4 examines the case of information provision. Section 5 examines the case of combined policy instruments regime, and Section 6 concludes the paper. The proofs of all the results presented in the paper are delineated in the Appendix.
The model
Assume a horizontally di erentiated product that generates individual and environmental damages. The product is o ered in two types, and the magnitude of both individual and external damages di ers between them. For simplicity, we assume that the "clean" good does not generate any damages, while the "dirty" good generates positive individual and external damages. We further assume that if consumers are informed, they take into account the individual damage. The utility that the informed consumer derives from the consumption of one unit of the dirty good decreases by a parameter , while that from one unit of the clean good increases by a parameter . While captures individual damages, the parameter captures the increased appreciation of the clean good as consumers learn about the bad characteristics of the dirty good. Thus, we allow for two dimensions of product heterogeneity, vertical product di erentiation based on individual damages and horizontal product di erentiation based on variety.
We further assume that only a fraction of the consumers are informed about the individual damage that the dirty good generates. For simplicity, we assume two groups of consumers, those with perfect knowledge of the negative e ect associated with the dirty good and those that have no knowledge at all. The informed consumers, which form fraction of the population, use the correct values of the parameters, that is, and , while the uniformed consumers set = = 0. Thus, they cannot distinguish between the two types of the product in terms of individual damages. The total population of the consumers is normalized to unity.
Within this framework, the utility of the representative informed consumer is:
2 A similar type of utility function has been introduced by Dixit (1979) and used in many works such as Singh and Vives (1984) . For a comprehensive and complete presentation, see Martin (2002) .
where ( = ) are the quantities consumed of the clean and the dirty good respectively, and is the numeraire good produced by a competitive sector. Thus, utility is quadratic in the consumption of goods and linear in the consumption of other goods . The assumption of separable and linear utility in the numeraire good, implies no income e ects in the oligopolistic sector and allows us to perform partial equilibrium analysis. The parameter [0 1] measures the degree of substitutability between the types of the product.
3 If = 0, product demands are completely independent, and each firm has monopolistic market power. If = 1, the products are perfect substitutes. In this paper we assume that the two types of the product are less than perfect substitutes, that is, 1, where is the critical value of the degree of substitutability guaranteeing that both informed and uninformed consumers purchase, in all cases examined, positive quantities of both types of the good.
The consumer's utility maximization problem yields direct demands for each good,
, where = (1 ) + , and = + , with = , and 6 = .
The total demand for the clean and the dirty good is, = + (1 ) and = + (1 ) respectively, where and ( and ) are the quantities of the dirty (clean) good consumed by the informed and the uniformed consumer, respectively. That is, ( ) and ( = = 0), where = . The two types of the good are o ered by two oligopolists competing in prices. For simplicity we assume that they both produce with the same constant marginal cost . In the absence of government intervention, each firm solves the following profit maximization problem,
which yields the price reaction function,
, where = and 6 = .
Thus, in the absence of policy intervention, the two reaction functions can then be solved for the equilibrium prices, (2) that as decreases, the price-cost margin increases and thus the market distortion increases. The fact that informed consumers have higher demand for the clean good allows the firm producing it to raise its price relative to the case where all consumers were uninformed, while the firm producing the dirty good decreases its price. The e ect of informed consumers' presence on price is proportional to the fraction of the informed consumers and is positively related to both s.
Substituting the values of 0 and 0 from equation (2) into the direct demand functions given in equation (1) yields the equilibrium demand of both groups of individuals for both types of the di erentiated good, that is, 0 , 0 , 0 and 0 , and the aggregate demand, 0 and 0 . Substituting the values of and , = in the utility function, we get the inverse utility of the informed, ( ), and the uniformed consumer, ( ), both evaluated at the true values of s. We evaluate the uninformed consumer's utility at 0, = in order to get its true and not the perceived value. Proposition 1 compares the case with no informed consumers to the case with a fraction of the consumers informed (both in the case with no government intervention). We use a superscript 0 to denote the equilibrium values of the variables when a fraction of consumers are informed and a hat to denote the equilibrium values when all consumers are uninformed. When all consumers are uninformed ( = 0 and = = 0), they purchase the same quantity of both types of the product, that is, b = b = b = b , since we have assumed they are imperfect substitutes with equal marginal cost of production. The informed (uninformed) consumers' consumption of the clean good increases (decreases) and that of the dirty good decreases (increases) relative to the case where no consumer was informed. The direct e ect of the informed consumer's action to take into account individual damages dominates the indirect e ect of the resulting price changes, and, thus, she consumes more of the clean and less of the dirty good relative to the case where all consumers were uninformed. The uninformed consumer's choices are influenced only by the indirect price e ect, and, thus, she consumes more of the dirty and less of the clean good.
The aggregate output of the clean good increases and that of the dirty decreases. Although the uninformed individuals' consumption of the dirty (clean) good increases (decreases) because of the response to price changes, total consumption of the clean (dirty) good increases (decreases). The increase in the aggregate consumption of the clean good is positively related to and both s. The substitution away from the dirty and towards the clean good by the informed consumers results in a reduction of the environmental externality. However, this welfare improving result comes at a cost to the informed consumers, as stated in the following Remark:
The informed consumers' choices yield public benefits due to reduced environmental damages, and have private costs since they increase consumption of the more expensive good. Thus, uninformed consumers free ride, unintentionally, on the e orts of the informed consumers to reduce the environmental externality.
The shift in the informed consumer's demand away from the dirty and towards the clean good decreases the level of her individual damages, but in the same time it has a negative e ect on her overall consumption to the extent that she consumes higher quantity of the more expensive good. If , the price e ect is strong enough so that the informed consumers' total consumption of both goods is less than that of the uninformed consumers. 4 From the point of view of the individual and external damages imposed by the dirty good, two reasons call for government's intervention: first, to correct an information asymmetry problem, since only a fraction of the consumers take into account the individual damage and second to correct an externality problem, one that cannot be eliminated even when all consumers are informed. Assuming that the government does not intervene separately to correct the market distortion arising from imperfect competition, any policy attempting to correct the two problems mentioned above, 4 From equations (6) and (7) in the Appendix, we show
within a welfare maximizing framework, would have to take into account the existing market distortion. In what follows, we examine two types of regulatory response, namely a tax on the dirty good and information provision regarding the damages that consumption of the dirty good causes on consumers.
Optimal taxation
Assume that the regulator imposes a tax on the dirty good. The firm that o ers the dirty good solves the following profit maximization problem,
The two firms' price reaction functions yield prices as functions of the tax rate,
Prices of both goods are higher relative to the unregulated case for all 0, and they are both increasing in the tax rate. Although the tax is levied on the dirty good, the price of the clean good increases as well because of the strategic complementarity in the choice variables. The e ect of taxation on increases with the degree of substitutability. Thus, in addition to the e ect that the shift of the informed consumers' consumption has on prices, which is positive on and negative on as discussed in the previous Section, the tax has a positive e ect on both prices. The overall e ect of the informed consumers' action and the government's policy on is positive but on is ambiguous. The price of the dirty good could increase or decrease, depending on the values of the parameters, that is whether 2 R . Substituting the values of and from equation (3) into the direct demand functions given in equation (1) yields the individual's demand as a function of the tax rate, that is, ( ) and ( ), from which we obtain ( ), =
. Substituting the values of ( ) and ( ) into the individual's utility function yields the indirect utility of the informed consumer, ( ), and the uniformed consumer ( ), both evaluated at the true values of s. In deriving the optimal tax, the regulator uses the true value of the uninformed consumer's utility, even though the consumer does not take into account the individual damages when making choices. The regulator derives the optimal tax rate from the social welfare maximization problem, . It accounts for the external damages, the asymmetry of information, and the fact that neither firm produces the socially optimal output.
Since the government has only one policy instrument to address all three existing distortions, the tax consists of three components: one that accounts for the externality problem ( ), a second that accounts for the information asymmetry ((1 ) e ), and a third component that accounts for imperfect competition, when the two goods are less than perfect substitutes ( ). The lower is the level of output relative to the social optimum, the lower is the tax level. As a result, the second-best tax is below marginal damages. As the degree of substitutability between the two goods increases, the market distortion becomes less prominent, and the size of the term decreases. As already noted, we concentrate on cases where the two goods are less than perfect substitutes ( 1) , in which cases the tax rate is positive. Denoting with a superscript the equilibrium values of the variables in the case of taxation, Proposition 2 summarizes the main results.
Proposition 2
The optimal tax on the dirty good has the following e ects on the equilibrium values:
0 , and 0 . (iii) A uniform tax on the dirty good ignores the asymmetric behavior of consumers, exacerbating the unintentional free-riding of the uninformed consumers on the informed consumers' voluntary actions. As a consequence, the informed consumer's utility decreases as a result of taxation.
Taxation increases the clean good's consumption by both groups of individuals and thus the aggregate consumption relative to the benchmark case of no policy intervention. Viewed as a percentage increase over the unregulated equilibrium, the uninformed consumer's demand for the clean good increases by a higher percentage relative to the demand of the informed consumer, that is, . This is because informed individuals consume more clean good even before taxation.
Apart from the fact that we are in a second-best framework due to market imperfections, another problem is specific to the case at hand. Since the regulator is unable to distinguish between the two groups of individuals, the tax is uniform. The second part of the tax, (1 ) e , is intended to create an incentive to decrease their consumption of the dirty good because of individual damages. However, informed consumers have already taken into account individual damages. Similarly, uninformed consumers pay only (1 ) e through the tax, instead of e (which would be the optimal incentive). Therefore, at the equilibrium, the informed consumers purchase more than the full information optimal quantity of the clean good, while the uninformed consume less than the optimal quantity. The inability of the regulator to distinguish between the two groups of individuals exacerbates the unintentional free riding e ect of the uninformed consumers' behavior described in Remark 1. Therefore, a uniform tax is not an e cient instrument to address the problem of asymmetric information. For this reason, the next Section explores information provision as an alternative policy instrument.
Information provision
Assume that the regulator decides to improve the situation by informing consumers about the negative e ects of consuming the dirty good. The regulator targets a fraction of consumers who, upon receiving the information, take into account the individual damages that the consumption of the dirty good imposes on them. Since the government does not know the true type of each individual it must target all consumers. We assume that information reaches consumers in each group with equal probability.
Information provision a ects the aggregate demand for both goods. More precisely, upon information reaching a fraction of consumers, the aggregate demand of the dirty and the clean good becomes, = + (1 ) and = +(1 ) respectively, where = +(1 ) and 1 = (1 )(1 ). The cost of reaching a fraction of consumers is, ( ) = , where is the slope of the marginal cost of information provision. In support of the latter assumption, they argue that "..it becomes increasingly expensive to reach higher fractions of the population, either because preferred media become saturated, or because the target population is heterogeneous along a second dimension, namely, the tendency to view ads." (p. 66). Tirole (1989) , p. 293, employs the particular quadratic advertisement cost function used here.
The two reaction functions resulting from the duopolists' profit maximization problems yield prices as functions of , Contrary to the case of taxation, information provision does not have any direct e ect on prices. The policy intervention has only an indirect e ect on prices, through the change on both goods' demand, since an additional (1 ) fraction of consumers become informed. Comparison of equation (4) to (2) reveals that the firm producing the dirty good responds to this development by decreasing its price, while the firm producing the clean good increases its price relative to the unregulated equilibrium. 6 Thus, while the tax has a positive e ect on both prices, information provision has a positive e ect on the price of the clean good but a negative e ect on the price of the dirty good.
Substituting the values of and from equation (4) into the direct demand functions given in equation (1) yields the individual's demand as a function of , that is, ( ) and ( ), from which we obtain, ( ), =
.
Substituting the values of ( ) and ( ) into the individual's utility function yields the indirect utility of the informed consumer, ( ), and the uniformed consumer ( ), both evaluated at the true values of s. The optimal fraction of consumers to which the regulator provides information is derived from the social welfare maximization problem,
. Lemma 2 presents the main properties of the optimal .
Lemma 2 The optimal fraction of consumers to which the regulator provides information , is (i) inversely related to the initial fraction of the informed consumers, and = 0 for = 1, (ii) increasing in the marginal external damage , (iii) increasing in both s, (iv) decreasing in the slope of the marginal cost of advertisement .
Although the marginal external damage and the degree of substitutability a ect the optimal , information provision concerns primarily individual damages and for that reason, the regulator does not provide any information, that is, = 0 when either all consumers are informed ( = 1), 6 From the definition of we have that , 1 and 0. (1 2 )(4 2 ) 2 , that is, if the second order condition of the welfare maximization holds.
7 Figure 1 depicts as a function of . Since is defined as a fraction, it cannot exceed unity. Thus,
, where is the value of for which = 1. Therefore, if the cost of providing information is low, the optimum choice is to inform the entire population.
Contrary to the case of taxation, information provision is a policy instrument that deals only indirectly with the externality problem, while similarly to taxation it takes into account the market imperfection. It spreads existing "good behavior" among the population instead of providing economic incentives by changing the relative prices directly. In this framework, information provision could be called a "focused" or "soft" policy instrument.
Proposition 3 summarizes the e ect of information provision on the choice variables and welfare. We denote with a superscript the equilibrium values of the variables in the case of information provision. for high values of , while for low values of (and when information asymmetry is relatively important as compared to the externality problem).
Information provision primarily a ects the composition of the two groups of consumers. Within each group of consumers, information provision affects individual consumers' demand indirectly, through the change in relative prices. Since information provision does not a ect prices directly, the only e ects on the quantities demanded are the enhancement of the indirect price e ects discussed in Section 2. Following the same line of argument as in Section 2, the increase in the number of informed consumers yields a decrease (increase) of individual consumers' demand for the clean (dirty) good relative to the unregulated case, that is, 0 and 0 , = . The increase in the number of informed consumers more than compensates for the decrease in the quantity of the clean good demanded by each type of individuals. Aggregate demand for the clean (dirty) good increases (decreases) relative to the unregulated equilibrium, that is, 0 and 0 . Compared to the case of taxation, aggregate quantity demanded of the clean good could be either higher or lower. Under three conditions, taxation is more e ective in shifting demand toward the clean good (that is, and ): when information provision is relatively expensive, external and individual damages are prominent and the degree of substitutability is not very high. When the cost of providing information is relative low, , and thus, = 1. In this case, information provision could be more e ective than taxation in shifting demand toward the clean good if individual damages are not negligible relative to the external damages.
Information provision improves welfare relative to the unregulated case, 0 . When the cost of information provision is substantial, however, this improvement is less than the welfare improvement obtained by the tax policy. The dominance of taxation over information provision relates to the fact that taxation deals with the environmental externality in a more direct way and the information asymmetry in an indirect way. Therefore, when the the degree of substitutability is not very high, the tax rate is high and thus, taxation is more e ective than information provision in shifting consumption away from the dirty and towards the clean type of the di erentiated product, yielding a higher level of welfare. Uniform taxation ignores the di erence in the behavior of informed and uninformed consumers however, and it thus exacerbates the unintentional free riding behavior of the uninformed consumers. Information provision avoids the problem of distributing the burden in favor of uninformed consumers, but since it does not provide any direct price incentive is not as e ective as taxation, at least when information costs are su ciently high.
If information can be provided at low cost, welfare under information provision increases drastically. In such case, the government could provide information to the entire population, and thus all consumers take into account individual damages. The information asymmetry problem is eliminated entirely, while the environmental externality is partially internalized. Figure 2 depicts as a function of . In Figure 2 , consists of two parts. The first is a straight line ( = 1), for = 1. 8 Only the portion of this line to the left of is solid, because only this portion is part of the overall function of as a function of . The second part is a convex curve ( ), for interior solutions for , which is tangent to ( = 1) at = . Only the portion of this curve to the right of is solid, as only this portion is part of ( ). When = 0,which implies = 1, if the individual damages are not negligible relative to the external damages. As increases, welfare decreases and eventually, it falls below the welfare under taxation. As shown in Figure 2 , the value after which , could be either lower or higher than , that is, taxation could dominate information provision even when information is provided to the entire population, depending on the values of the parameters.
Combination of taxation and information provision
The discussion in the previous Sections indicates the inability of either taxation or information provision policy to deal e ciently and e ectively with the existing distortions when implemented alone. The present Section examines the case in which the regulator uses a combination of the two policy instruments, namely a tax on the dirty good, , and information provision, , where indicates the values of the policy instruments when used in combination (their equilibrium values will be indicated with an Despite the strong similarities of the above expressions to those in (3) and (4), the prices under the combined policies scenario are di erent from those in the case of taxation and information provision. Although the e ect of government's intervention is clearly positive on the price of the clean good, the price of the dirty good could be lower or higher than the price in the unregulated case, depending on the values of and . In fact, increases the higher is the tax rate but decreases the higher is . Substituting the values of and from equation (5) into the direct demand functions given in equation (1), yields ( ) and ( ), from which we obtain, ( ), = . Following the same steps as in both previous cases, we define social welfare as a function of the government's choice variables. The solution of the social welfare maximization problem yields the optimal and which are presented in Lemma 3.
Lemma 3
When the government implements a policy that combines a tax on the dirty good with information provision, the values of the tax and the fraction of consumers to whom the government provides information are lower relative to the case that each policy is implemented alone. That is, and , where = + , and is defined in the Appendix.
Since information provision increases the number of informed individuals, the required tax rate is lower. Similarly, since taxation shifts consumption of both groups towards the clean good the necessary information provision is lower. The increase in the fraction of informed individuals, from to = + (1 ) , diminishes the problem of misallocating the burden of reducing the externality, a problem we have associated with taxation in Section 3. Proposition 4 summarizes the e ect of the combined policy on the choice variables and welfare. We denote with a superscript the equilibrium values of the variables in the combined policy instruments case.
Proposition 4
When the market imperfection is not prominent, the combined policy instruments regime has the following e ects on the equilibrium values of output and welfare:
and , 0, (iii) The combined policy instruments regime improves welfare relative to the cases where each policy instrument is used alone.
The combined policy instruments regime shifts individuals' demand more towards the clean good relative to both the unregulated and the information provision cases, but is less aggressive than the taxation case. Although individual consumers purchase less of the clean good under the combined policy instruments regime than under taxation, the fact that more consumers are informed results in higher aggregate demand for the clean good in the former than in the latter case. Therefore, the combination of policies unambiguously shifts aggregate demand towards the clean good at the same time that it reduces, relative to the case of taxation, the burden on informed consumers from reducing the externality. Since the combined policy instruments regime allocates the e ort to internalize the externality among individuals more e ciently, it is also welfare superior to the cases in which each policy instrument is used alone, that is, and .
Conclusions
In this paper we examine information provision as an alternative and/or as a complementary policy instrument to environmental taxation when a good imposes direct damages on the individual consumer, in addition to an environmental externality. We show that when information provision is used alone, although it yields a welfare improvement over the case of no intervention, it is welfare dominated by taxation, except if the cost of information provision is low enough. However, a policy regime that combines information provision and taxation dominates taxation in terms of welfare. This is because a uniform taxation levies a heavier than the optimal burden on the informed consumers, while the uninformed consumers free ride on the informed consumers voluntary actions. The combination of policy instruments regime allocates the e ort of reducing the consumption of the environmentally damaging good more e ciently among consumers.
The current analysis can be extended in many directions. First, it would be worth examining the combined policy regime within a balanced budget requirement. In such case, the cost of providing information would be financed by the tax revenues. The analysis could also be extended to consider the problem in a dynamic framework, where the fraction of consumers acquiring information evolves over time as a function of the accumulated information provided by the government. Within this framework it would be quite interesting to find the time path of the optimal tax rate as the fraction of informed consumers rises, especially within a revenue neutral policy.
The analysis of private incentives for information provision and the interplay with the government's policies is another very interesting extension. From the above analysis it is clear that the firm producing the clean good has incentives to provide information to consumers. It is quite straightforward to calculate the level of information that the firm producing the clean type of the good will provide and compare it to the optimal provided by the government. Actually, within the framework of our model it can be shown that the clean firm has greater incentives than the government to provide information to consumers, provided that the uninformed consumers rationally expect that the content of advertising is truthful. However, we choose not to present this analysis in the present paper because the current framework does not allow us to deal with important issues such as cred-ibility of privately provided information, or the possible role of public or private authentication agencies and environmental groups. (2) into the direct demand functions given in equation (1), yields the equilibrium level of output,
where = (1 2 ) (4 2 ), = (2 + ) (1 ) ( ) and = 2 + (3 2 ) , with = and 6 = . There are two e ects on the equilibrium outputs. A direct e ect, representing the attempt of the informed consumers to take into account the individual damage, due to which the informed consumers' demand for the clean (dirty) good increases (decreases) (second term in and ). An indirect e ect due to the change in both prices (last term in , , and ). The direct dominates the indirect e ect on the informed consumer's demand, and thus, at the equilibrium, the informed consumer purchases more of the clean and less of the dirty good relative to the case that all consumers were uninformed, that is, (ii) The total output for each good is,
The aggregate equilibrium quantity of the clean good increases and that of the dirty good decreases relative to the case that all consumers were uninformed, that is, 0 b and 0 b . The change is proportional to 9 Note that,
the fraction of the informed consumers and is positively related to both and . In the symmetric case, that is, = , we have = , and thus, the increase in 0 equals the decrease in 0 .
A2. Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. Substituting the values of and from equation (3) into the direct demand functions given in equation (1), yields the individual's demand as a function of the tax rate,
The higher the tax rate is, the more clean and the less dirty good is consumed by both groups of consumers (last term in the expressions in equation (9) and (10)). The di erence between the consumption of the informed and uninformed consumers remains the same as the unregulated case. The total output for each good is,
On the aggregate, the higher the tax rate is, the more of the clean and the less of the dirty good is consumed.
Substituting the values of and , = from equation (9) and (10) into the consumer's utility function, we get the indirect utility of the informed consumer, ( ), and the uniformed consumer, ( ), both evaluated at the true values of s. 10 That is, the regulator evaluates both the informed and the uninformed consumers' utility taking into account the true value of the damage that the consumption of the dirty good imposes on them and the increased appreciation of the clean good. The regulator also accounts for the externality generated by the consumption of the dirty good by subtracting from the social 10 It should be noted that the di erence between the indirect utility of the informed and the uninformed consumer decreases in the tax rate. The di erence under taxation is ( ) ( ) = welfare, where is the marginal external damage. The regulator derives the optimal tax rate from the social welfare maximization problem,
The solution of the above maximization problem yields,
where, e = ³ + 3 4 3 2
´.
The third term in equation (12) captures the adjustment of the tax rate necessary to take into account the existing distortion in the market, given the existence of and s. This is in line with the literature on environmental taxation under imperfect competition, which shows that the optimal environmental tax falls short of the marginal external damage in order to take into account the fact that production is at a lower than the optimal level. In accordance with the literature, the market-imperfection adjustment term is higher the stronger is the market imperfection. (11) to (8) reveals the result. (iii) Substituting the optimal value of the tax rate from equation (12) into equations (9), (10) and (11) we get the equilibrium quantities of the two goods,
where,
2 ) + (4 3 2 ) . The superscript indicates equilibrium values under the tax policy. The informed consumer consumes more of the clean and less of the dirty good relative to the uninformed consumer, as we discussed above. The di erences remain the same as under the unregulated equilibrium, that is,
0. Assuming a positive tax, the consumption of the clean good increases and that of the dirty good decreases for both groups of consumers, that is, 0 and 0 , = .
12
The aggregate equilibrium output for the clean and dirty good are,
The regulator, in trying to redirect the production away from the dirty good and towards the clean good, by applying a uniform tax, it misallocates the required e ort between informed and uninformed consumers.
From equations (11) to (8) we get, 0 = 0, and
Substituting the values of and , = from equations (9) and (10) into the utility function we derive the indirect utility for both groups of consumers. We then derive the di erence between the indirect utility of the informed and uninformed consumer in the unregulated case and the case of taxation,
Substituting the value of the optimal tax in the nominator of 0 yields,
12 From equations (9) and (6) we get 0 = (1 2 )(4 2 ) 0, and from equations (10) and (7) we get
0, 0, where = .
(4
]. This expression is negative except in cases that both and approach 1, cases in which we are not interested in. Thus, for the range of parameters that we are interested in, the utility of the informed consumer is lower at the taxation equilibrium relative to the unregulated equilibrium, that is 0 . The welfare di erence between the unregulated case and the case of taxation is
Substituting into the above equation the indirect utility and aggregate output di erences we found above, yields,
0 .
A4. Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. Substituting the values of and from equation (4) into the direct demand functions given in equation (1), yields the individual's demand as a function of ,
The aggregate output for each good is,
As in the case of taxation, the regulator evaluates both the informed and the uniformed consumers' utility using the true values of s. The regulator derives the optimal fraction of consumers , that receive information from the social welfare maximization problem,
The solution of the above maximization problem yields, , and = . Assuming interior solutions, the fraction of the consumers that the regulator targets with advertisement is positively related to the marginal external damage, that is, 0, and negatively to the slope of the marginal cost of advertisement, 0. These relationships are evident from equation (20) .
In the case of symmetric responses, that is, = = 6 = 0, the demand and cost parameters do not a ect the optimal . In such case, equation (20) reduces to,
In this case, =
. In this case it is relatively easy to show that is positively related to , since = (1 )
is positive.
A5. Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. (i) The only di erence between equations (17), (18) and (6) , (7) is in the fraction of consumers that belong to each of the two groups, that is, the fraction of informed consumers has increased by (1 ) . Compared to the case of taxation, individuals' consumption of the clean good is lower and that of the dirty good higher. Formally, from equations (17), (18) and (9), (10) (ii) From equations (19) to (8) we get, 0 =
0, and (11) ues of , and significant external damages, that is, when the market distortion is not prominent and the tax rate is positive. When the cost of providing information is low, and more precisely when , that is, in the range of values for which = 1, the above condition is more di cult to hold. Assuming = , setting = 1 and substituting the optimal value of tax from equation (12) yields, . It is clear that the nominator of this expression can be negative, the lower is the value of and the higher is the value of relatively to . Therefore, in the case of low cost of information provision and small degree of substitutability, information provision can be more e ective than taxation in shifting the demand towards the clean type of the product.
(iv) Substituting the values of ( ) and ( ), = from equations (17) and (18) into the utility function we derive the indirect utility for both groups of consumers under information provision, as a function of . We then derive the di erence between the indirect utility of the informed and uninformed consumer in the unregulated case and the case of taxation ,
. The welfare di erence between the unregulated case and the case of information provision is,
2 ) , where = 2(4 2 ) , and
0, is the the denominator of in equation (20) .
Note that
Substituting the values of the welfare di erence from equations (16) and (21) 
0. In the case of corner solutions, when the cost of advertisement is low enough to induce = 1, the previous relationship does not present the welfare difference since we cannot use the internal solution for . In the extreme case of zero cost of providing information, and assuming = to simplify the expression, the welfare di erence is,
, where
2 ) ) ], and = (2 )
2 (2 + (1 2 )) (1 + ) (2 + ) 2 ( 7 6 ) 2 ]. The welfare di erence is positive for high values of . The welfare di erence could be negative for low values of . As approaches 0, the nominator of the welfare di erence approaches ( 2 ) 2 4 ( ) 2 2 , which is negative for high values of . Thus, if 0, at = 0, it is possible that 0 for a range of values of up to . Therefore, for moderate values of the degree of substitutability and when individual damages are not negligible relative to the external damage, information provision could dominate taxation if the cost of providing information is low enough that government provides information to the entire population. The total output for each good is, (24) = + + , = (2 2 ) .
As in both previous cases, the regulator evaluates both the informed and the uniformed consumers' utility using the true value of s. The regulator derives the optimal level of the choice variables and from the social welfare maximization problem,
The solution of the above maximization problem yields, . Assuming that the denominator in (25) is positive, that is, the second order condition for welfare maximization, 00 0, holds, we get, 0, 0, 0 and 0.
A7. Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. (i) From equations (22), (23) and (6), (7) we get,
, and
(2 2 ) , = . Compared to the unregulated case, individual consumers' demand for the clean (dirty) good increases (decreases) if (1 ) (1 ) 2 2 . From equations (22), (23) and (9), (10) (22), (23) and (17), (18) (iii) From equations (24) to (8) ) and ( ), = from equations (27) and (23) into the utility function we derive the indirect utility for both groups of consumers under information provision, as a function of and . We then derive the di erence between the indirect utility of the informed and uninformed consumer in the unregulated case and the case of combined policy instruments, that is 0 and 0 . The welfare di erence 14 It is evident that this inequality holds since, between the the unregulated case and the case of information provision is,
Substituting the output and indirect utility di erences yields,
2 (4 2 ) .
A su cient condition for the above to be positive is 2 0, which always holds. Therefore, 0 . Note that = 0 ( 0 ). Substituting the values of the welfare di erences from (16) 
